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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this contribution is to draw a picture of the (uneven) distribution of 
economic activities across the states of the European Union (EU) and the 
consequences entailed by it. We will briefly summarize the most salient and recent 
contributions. Then, in the light of the economic geography theory, we will discuss 
the economic and social advantages and disadvantages associated with a core–
periphery structure. In this sense, particular attention will be addressed to the EU 
financial system of Structural Funds and the effects they produced. Finally, we will 
formulate some suggestions, relying on the EU experience, that could be of interest to 
the current Brazilian regional policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The unbalanced territorial distribution of resources is quite a common problem that various 
countries all around the world have to face. In recent times, the strong connection between 
economics and space has been widely studied in the economic literature. Spatial imbalances are 
often the source of economic inequalities. Then, typical economic problems can entail important 
consequences at the social level too. 
 The sources of an uneven distribution of activities are various. Naturally, it is easy to 
identify the concentration of persons and activities in cities. Firm owners like to cluster together 
in proximity to cities because the concentration of skills, infrastructures and the whole 
environment provided by cities are very attractive (this is known as the urbanization process). 
This tendency is also reinforced by the worker-migration process: workers migrate where there 
is a demand for their skills. At the same time, the concentration of productive activities 
attracting more and more activities also makes it interesting for consumers to settle there. 
Shopping facilities and business services are available in one place and this particular advantage 
is much appreciated by consumers. This organization of space with more and less concentrated 
areas of firms and people becomes more evident in the light of the progressive reduction of 
transport costs for delivering goods. 
 Beside the classical problem of congestion entailed by the growing urbanization rate, a 
deeper structural transformation appears when the centripetal forces for locating resources in a 
single place (such as a city) are strong. The endogenous system of organizing the territory is 
nurturing a developed center (the city) against an underdeveloped territory (the periphery or 
rural area). Here, the unbalanced economic structure appears and different growth and 
developing perspectives for each of the two territorial units (the city and the periphery) are to be 
considered.  
 As one can easily realize, this structure, known as core–periphery, can be freely spread 
across a region or a nation. Then, in order to a guarantee a standard level of welfare to all the 
citizens belonging to either the same region or nation, local authorities (and to a larger extent 
governments) have to focus more on implementing policies to break the mechanism of the self-
reinforcing unbalanced structure.  
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 There is a wide range of interventions authorities can propose: improving transport and 
other infrastructures to connect lagging areas (in the periphery) with the fast-growing ones (in 
the core), or fostering the creation of agglomeration sites in the peripheral areas. 
 Is there a more efficient policy? Is there any experience of the policies adopted by 
governments and institutions? 
 There is no unique answer that can address these two issues. This article is exactly about the 
experience of the European Union and the policies it promotes to contrast the internal core–
periphery structure. In particular, the aim is to describe the kinds of intervention supported by 
the European Union and their results and to explore possible paths to make them suitable for 
application in Brazil too. 
 As we argue throughout this contribution, there are some interesting features supported and 
promoted by the European Union that it could also be interesting to implement in Brazil. This 
article is organized as follows. First, we provide a general description of the economic structure 
within the European Union (Section 2) and the meaning of a core–periphery structure (Section 
3). Section 4 is devoted to a general overview of the Structural Funds that the European Union 
promoted in order to solve the economic and social problems entailed by the unbalanced 
internal structure. In Section 5, we provide a statistical analysis of the internal structure of the 
Brazilian economy and then we discuss to what extent European policies could turn out to be 
feasible in Brazil. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Economic structure of the European Union 
 
One clear feature of the distribution of activities across the European Union is the strong uneven 
pattern jointly with an evident sectoral specialization (Amiti, 1999). Since the 1980s, all 
countries have become more specialized, even if there is no clear trend toward a concentration 
pattern at industry level (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002). 
These differences are reflected in various economic indicators. According to Puga (2002), 
the differences in income across European regions are higher than those across US states. To be 
more precise, in 1992, the leading European regions recorded a GDP per person of 1.6 times the 
European average and 3.5 times that of the lagged regions.1 In time, European regions 
experienced a strong convergence process in income per capita that stopped at the beginning of 
                                                 
1 These data are mostly referring to regions identified by the NUTS 1 classification for spatial units. 
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the 1980s. The interesting feature of the European variations in income per capita is that income 
inequalities across states fell (by 25%) but the regional ones rose (by 10%). 
Figure 1: The structure of the European Union (Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
As discussed in Combes and Overman (2004) and shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, it is quite 
easy to identify a rich core of regions at the heart of the European Union that have quite a high 
GDP per capita and are located close one to another and a poor peripheral area located away 
from the core. The core regions have the advantage of enjoying good access to the EU markets. 
The progressive integration improved the accessibility of the core regions relatively more 
quickly than the peripheral ones.  
Figure 2: Geographic income inequality (1999) (Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006) 
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Looking at the distribution of the total production and the relative sectoral composition, 
Combes and Overman (2004) detect a few stylized facts: even if the structure of the production 
inside the EU countries is relatively different, there are some groups of countries with a similar 
structure. Half of the regions are more specialized and the others less so. In general, high-tech 
increasing returns activities are more spatially concentrated. For instance, the economies of 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom are very similar and tend to specialize in high-tech 
and high-skill industries. They all are dissimilar to Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain are the countries enjoying most of the Cohesion Funds. 
Nevertheless, their structures are quite dissimilar. Portugal and Greece display a tendency to 
specialize in low-tech and low-skill industries. Spain is specialized in the medium-tech and 
medium-skill sectors, while Ireland in the medium-high tech and skill sectors. Then, concerning 
the other countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Italy are quite similar in terms of 
specialization (medium skill and medium tech); the Netherlands is an outlier (low tech and 
higher skill). Finally, the Scandinavian countries Finland and Norway are quite similar, with a 
relatively high-tech specialization. 
 
3. The strengths and weaknesses of a core–periphery structure 
 
Empirical evidence points out that firms and workers enjoy settling in close proximity to large 
markets. In the same manner, large markets are those that attract more firms and workers. This 
specific attitude is the main driving force fostering a core–periphery structure. 
Economic geography theory builds on some guidelines developed by Krugman (1991) and 
then extended in different directions.2 
The core of the economic geography theoretical framework is very intuitive. Let us consider 
a situation in which we consider two (identical) regions endowed with the same economic 
structure and the same number of workers. Workers cannot move across the two sectors. In each 
region, there exists a monopolistically competitive sector whose firms may freely move from 
one region to the other and a perfect competitive sector that is completely immobile (for 
instance the agricultural sector). At the beginning, we are assuming we are in a completely 
                                                 
2 A complete overview of this kind of subject can be found in Fujita et al. (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2002) and 
Baldwin et al. (2003). The content of the first two books is developed on the base of the core–periphery model, 
while the last one also introduces the concept of the footloose capital model. This framework is different from the 
standard core–periphery one because it assumes that the mobile factor repatriates all its earnings to its country of 
origin. This leaves room for the possibility to consider the physical or knowledge capital the mobile factor rather 
than labor. 
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symmetric situation, hence both the regions have the same share of industry and workers. 
However, if for any reason a few firms left one region to locate in the other, then a structural 
change may be produced. In the case where workers can move freely, the rise in the share of 
firms in one of the two regions (let us define it as the host region) increases the demand for 
workers, whose wages also increase, making it more attractive to workers. However, the 
incoming of new workers increases the local expenditure too (namely, the size of the host 
market increases) and this reinforces the attractiveness of the host region, which is receiving 
more and more firms. In such a way, the so-called core–periphery structure appears. Instead, in 
the case of complete immobility of workers, no concentration movement of firms takes place 
and the two regions can keep on being symmetric and identical. The mechanism producing the 
core–periphery structure and, also, reinforcing it is known as a ‘self-reinforcing’ mechanism.3 
Another seminal contribution in this stream of literature is by A. Venables (1996). In this 
paper, the author addresses an important issue. He is able to identify further forces that are able 
to sustain the formation of agglomeration poles even in the absence of labor migration. These 
specific forces are the vertical linkages between upstream and downstream industries. Those 
linkages are then able to determine the size of the markets at different locations as it occurs with 
migration. 
The model introduced by Krugman (1991) assesses that the agglomeration structure 
reinforces as much as the cost of transport costs in delivering goods between the two regions 
reduces.4 However, the relationship between transport costs and agglomeration turns out not to 
be so linear in the absence of labor migration. If the concentration in one region makes the 
wages paid there relatively higher, the relationship between integration and agglomeration is not 
linear anymore. A sufficiently high level of integration can also trigger industrialization in 
peripheral regions. In fact, if workers do not move, wage differentials persist and transform into 
a dispersion force to break the concentrated structure, even if industry is still distributed in a 
different proportion in both the regions (but it is not concentrated in just one of them). In the 
absence of the mobility of workers, even if trade costs are low, firms locate in the region with 
the lowest level of wages, while with a high level of transport costs, firms aim at locating as 
close as possible to the final demand. Hence, regional disparities may appear just for the 
intermediate value of transport costs.  
                                                 
3 Inside the European Union, this mechanism of circular causation faces a problem of low migration rate. As argued 
in Puga (2002), there are objective cultural and language barriers preventing the free movement of workers across 
states associated with a general cultural aptitude of strong familiar ties preventing real interstate migration flow 
rates as in the US.   
4 This result has been generalized by augmenting the number of regions and introducing a differentiation between 
interregional and international transport costs, as in Monfort and Nicolini (2000) or Paluzie (2001). 
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 In the spirit of this framework, according to Puga (2002), the low mobility of workers 
inside the European Union associated with a progressive economic integration (by lowering the 
level of transport costs) may produce a convergence process across regions. However, the 
rigidity of wage setting at the national level associated with some differences in the local 
environment may also explain the progressive rise of income inequalities between regions 
within European countries. 
 
4. The EU structural funds: numbers and effects 
 
One of the principal aims of the creation of the European Union is to achieve greater economic 
and social cohesion for reducing disparities across its member states. To that end, some 
initiatives have been taken, one of which is the introduction of the Structural Funds.5 Since 
1989, the reforms of the financing system have made the Structural Funds the second most 
important area of intervention of the EU behind the CAP policy (Common Agricultural Policy). 
Some evidence is presented in Table 1 and Figure 3. 
These funds devote a large part of the financial resources of the EU to the poorest regions of 
the Union.6 These resources aim at correcting some deficiencies in the endowments of strategic 
factors of production, above all infrastructure and human capital, and helping the modernization 
and technological upgrade of firm production.   
According to Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), Objective 1 regions gained more than two-
thirds of the total Structural Fund expenditure. These funds are devoted to financing regional 
plans or multi-regional plans according to four priority axes: 
1. Supporting the agricultural and rural promotion 
2. Business and tourism support 
3. Investment in education, requalification and, more generally, supporting the human 
capital of these regions 
4. Investment in infrastructures, transport and the environment. 
                                                 
5 Other programs are patronized by the European Union, but they are not exclusively addressed to the group of 
regions labelled as Objective 1. Funds devoted to Objective 2 regions are those that aim at supporting the 
adaptation and modernization of areas facing structural difficulties and funds granted to regions labelled as 
Objective 3 target the adaptation and modernization of policies and the system of education, training and 
employment (Puga, 2002). (See Appendix 3). 
6 As a poor region, we are referring to a territorial unit of the EU whose income per capita achieves a value below 
75% of the EU average income. 
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However, in Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2007), a major concern is put forward about the 
real capacity of the European Structural Funds to deliver the objective they are expected to 
achieved European regional policy seems to target more objectives of income redistribution than 
sustainable development.  
According to their estimations, since 1993, the European regions have been experiencing a 
strong divergence process, while convergence is exclusive to the subset of regions enjoying the 
Objective 1 funds. Hence, from this viewpoint, these funds seem more to prevent further 
divergence across regions rather than to foster convergence. In fact, the bulk of this intervention 
(investment in infrastructure) seems to be experiencing a low level of return (as investment) in 
the short and the medium term, mostly because of the nature of this kind of investment itself. 
Instead, investments in human capital show positive medium-term returns, mostly because the 
recipient regions are experiencing a strong mismatch between education supply and labour 
demand reinforced by a low mobility of workers. 
 
Table 1: Structural funds’ expenditure structure (Source: Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007) 
 
 1989 2004 
Total Community expenditure (€ mill.) (2000 
prices) 
55,974 108,770 
Community expenditure as % of public 
expenditure in member states 
2 10.5 
Expenditure as % of the Community GDP 0.94 1.1 
Expenditure per capita (€) 129.5 301.6 
Expenditure per capita (€) (2000 prices) 171.4 284.2 
Development funds per capita (€) (2000 
prices) 
32.21 101 
Development funds on EU15 GDP (%) 0.18 0.42 
 
However, other interpretations may be considered.  
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Figure 3: Evolution of the spending priorities in the EU (Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the reform that took place in 1989, the action of the structural funds focused on the 
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(Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007). Despite the heavy investment efforts (Figure 4) (sizing in 
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poorest regions) – in 2004, before the enlargement ‘statistical’ effects (Figure 5) – are still those 
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 Figure 4: Evolution of the spending in the EU: levels (Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Objective 1 regions (2006) (Source: Eurostat) 
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In addition, according to Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004 and 2007), the composition of 
the expenditure of the Structural Funds deserves some attention. Almost half of the total 
expenditure was devoted to infrastructures and development, 25% went to the promotion of the 
local economies including tourism, while 12% was for human resources and 8% for rural 
development. 
In particular, financing the creation of a modern infrastructure system can be considered as 
one of the potential reasons for the low effectiveness of structural funds. 
According to the model of the New Economic Geography, transportation costs play an 
important role. In the case of mobility of workers, low transport costs favor a strong 
agglomeration in the core area, thereby contributing more to greater rather than lower disparities 
across regions. This is the bulk of the effect of modern infrastructure in a core–periphery 
structure: dispersion can arise again when other factors (such as the mobility of goods or the 
kind of transport costs) are taken into consideration.  
These results can be extended to the concrete situation of peripheral EU regions (namely 
almost all the members of the Objective 1 group). Their relatively lagged industrial structure 
associated with a more efficient transport system may reinforce the delocation process of the 
productive activities from the periphery to the center, exacerbating even more the regional 
imbalances. 
Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2007) also claim that the regions that have used the structural 
funds in a more balanced way by endorsing policies including all the three groups of 
interventions have performed better. In fact, their results also show that the expenditure in 
human capital within regions has been the development expenditure with significant positive 
results. 
From this perspective, two main considerations may be put forward: either the volume of 
structural funds has been globally below the critical threshold to finance properly all the 
chapters of expenditure and, then, to trigger a significant growth process across regions, or, at 
least, those funds help in smoothing the impact of the consequences of the self-reinforcing 
centripetal forces on regional development. 
This second way seems to be the path followed by other authors, such as de la Fuente, to 
evaluate the impact of the Structural Funds in Spain.  
In de la Fuente (2003), there appears a clear result: the rate of returns of investments in 
infrastructure is notable but a more rational redistribution of resources would have pushed the 
convergence process across regions even more. 
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The analysis of the effects on growth fuelled by the introduction of structural funds found in 
Spain one of the most salient cases. According to de la Fuente (2002), the impact of the 
Structural Funds in Spain (in the period 1994–1999) has been quite sizable, by adding around 
1% to the annual output growth in the average Objective 1 region and 0.4% to employment 
growth. To be more concrete, the Structural Funds helped to create around 300,000 new jobs 
and reduced by 20% (on average) the gap in income per capita of the regions receiving funds 
with respect to the rest of the country. However, by exploiting the statistics at hand, the author is 
able to identify a great uncertainty concerning the returns of the training expenditure. Moreover, 
investing more in infrastructures and other capital (by reducing the amount of subsidies) would 
be desirable. In another contribution focusing on the regional convergence process that took 
place across Spanish regions, de la Fuente (2008) refines the results previously obtained. The 
convergence process results in being fostered by structural funds when considering investment 
in infrastructures, while the same outcome does not hold in other cases. In addition, Spanish 
regions experienced a convergence process in stock of infrastructure per capita across time. 
Considering the period between 1965 and 2004, de la Fuente is able to establish that the 
investment in infrastructures contributed by about 0.5% yearly to the Spanish growth rate and 
0.25% to the Spanish employment rate. Moreover, the investment in infrastructures endorsed by 
EU funds allowed the speeding up of the convergence process across Spanish regions. 
Nevertheless, the wide dispersion of the returns of those investments across regions 
generates some inefficiencies that, to some extent, would have prevented a faster convergence 
rate among member states and, eventually, increased the internal inequality. 
 
Figure 6: Net contribution by member (Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-€8,000 -€6,000 -€4,000 -€2,000 €0 €2,000 €4,000 €6,000 €8,000
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Belgium
Ireland
Luxembourg
France
Denmark
EU15 Median
Finland
Italy
Austria
Sweden
Netherlands
UK
Germany
Net Financial Contribution, 2000
Net Financial Contribution, 1999
 13
In de la Fuente and Doménech (2001), some ideas about the possible budget reforms 
appeared. First of all, a problem associated with the status of net contributors and net receivers 
needed to be addressed (see Figure 6). The richer members of the EU (such as Germany or the 
United Kingdom) pressed for a reduction in their net contributions, but the poor countries 
argued that their positive net balances should be preserved on equity grounds. The proposal 
formulated by the two previous authors was clear:  
 “[...] linking fiscal balances to income per capita through a simple rule that reflects an 
evolving consensus on the desirable degree of redistribution and treats countries with 
similar income levels in a similar way”. (p. 319) 
In the wake of this idea, they proposed computing indicative net balances for each Member 
State on the basis of its income per capita and a fixed (commonly agreed) redistribution 
coefficient. Then, budget allocation to specific expenditure programs should be made on the 
base of relevant priorities in policy objectives with no concern for the net balances. The 
principal goal of this reform was to (i) improve the quality of budget decisions by acting on the 
incentive mechanisms, (ii) improve efficiency in the funding of horizontal programs totally 
independently of their impact on the member net balances.  
In a new proposal formulated by de la Fuente et al. (2008), in order to overcome the conflict 
among members concerning the distribution of the net financial burdens, they suggest linking 
the member’s state net balance to the relative prosperity, by the introduction of a system of 
compensating horizontal transfers. In such a way, EU members could achieve at once (i) the 
financial burden to be distributed in proportion to the ability to pay, (ii) countries with the same 
level of real income to have similar financial positions (the missing point of the current EU 
financing system).7 Furthermore, linking the net balance to the per-capita income level would 
help to simplify the EU budget transparencies as well as avoid any distortionary expenditure 
policy. 
For instance, nowadays, the European Commission has called for the introduction of the 
compensation mechanism for member countries experiencing excessive deficits (such as the 
United Kingdom). The proposal by de la Fuente et al. (2008) would be to require that no 
member state should sustain an excessively high budget deficit with respect to its level of 
prosperity (measured as income per capita in real terms). Then, a system of horizontal transfers 
                                                 
7 According to de la Fuente et al. (2008), the net effect of the EU budget is equivalent to a flat tax of 1.75% 
charging the difference between the country income and the EU average. However, countries with similar income 
per capita end up with a different treatment. Luxembourg (high income country), Greece and Ireland (relatively low 
income countries) are basically well treated. France and Germany, whose income level is almost the same, end up 
in different positions: the German deficit is almost double the French one.  
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across members would compensate for any deviation from the desired allocation following the 
rule applied to the current UK rebate. The final purpose would be that the countries with a level 
of income below the EU average would gain a net transfer from the richer ones, but with the 
fullfillment of the obligation to use these funds to finance investments fostering growth (such as 
those in infrastructure) to reduce the existing income disparities and, then, make the financing 
burden less heavy. 
Of course, this kind of solution would entail a negotiation bargaining process between 
resources and objectives. 
A few estimations confirm that this plan helps a redistribution of resources across countries: 
the most recent EU members would lose a part of the funds, while Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain would be called to increase their net contribution. They would both finance a net transfer 
to the remaining EU members. 
 
 
5. Any lessons for Brazil? 
 
As argued in Puga (2002), policies put in place by the European Union should help to reduce 
regional imbalances. However, agglomeration effects are difficult to control for. Clustering 
mechanisms may entail potential efficiency effects. In the case of sufficient mobility, the rise of 
an agglomeration pole can coexist with a convergence in income. The lack of mobility makes 
agglomeration poles and the convergence process incompatible. In that sense, public policy 
should force a dispersion process by working against the natural market forces.  
In order to achieve these results, the European Union approved an investment program (the 
Structural Funds) principally addressed to three potential tools favoring the break of the 
concentrating forces: training, subsidies to enterprises and investments in infrastructures. 
Concerning the evaluation of the potential effects of investments in training, economic 
geography models cannot be considered as a reference, since human capital is not (almost) 
explicitly included in the theoretical framework.  
These models mostly apply in the evaluation of the policy intervening in the creation of the 
infrastructure network and in the subsidies to enterprises. The former case perfectly fits in the 
economic geography theory while the latter is a less important case study to refer to with the 
theoretical framework we are considering. In fact, in the case of subsidies to firms, the central 
point is to preserve the positive externalities firms may enjoy in belonging to an agglomeration 
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pole. However, as shown in Nicolini (2003), focusing exclusively on fostering the creation of 
agglomerations as networks of firms is not always the right choice, because the rise of 
unspontaneous networks can entail some inefficiencies and losses in the total welfare of the 
territorial area hosting them. 
The policy targeting the creation of an efficient network of infrastructure in the less 
developed regions involves the idea of increasing the rate of growth of such regions. 
Nevertheless, the road or railway infrastructure when exploited for shipping goods is likely to 
affect strongly the distribution of the production and, then, nurture regional imbalances. Within 
a core–periphery structure, a more efficient transport network entails two principal effects. First, 
it gives firms belonging to the periphery better access to the resources concentrated in the core 
region(s), but it also gives the firms settled in the core the possibility to sell goods in the 
periphery, harming the local industrial system. 
Of course, economic geography theory points out that these effects are tempered by the 
condition of the local environment, namely the mobility rate. In the case of low mobility of 
workers associated with a similar level of wages both in the core and peripheral region(s), 
improving the transport infrastructure can even amplify the differences between the regions and 
reinforce the polarized structure. The European experience confirms this outcome: cities in the 
core enjoying high-speed railways have better accessibility to the surrounding space and growth 
is faster than for the others (Puga, 2002). 
What about Brazil? Does a core–periphery structure exist over there? 
We are briefly presenting some statistics with the purpose of drawing a picture of the 
distinguishing features of the Brazilian economic situation. In order to focus on the most salient 
factors associated with the economic geography framework, an analysis by state is preferred, 
since it can be assimilated to an analysis at level NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 in Europe. 
The political composition of Brazil is visually presented on a map included in Appendix 1. 
The first indicator showing the current structure and (possible) territorial imbalances is GDP 
per capita. This indicator is a measure of the wealth of the citizens belonging to a particular 
Brazilian state. Of course, this measure is not a perfect indicator, but it is a kind of rough 
measure of the purchasing power, and hence of the size, of the local markets. One of the most 
important problems we are expected to deal with when considering this type of information is 
the huge difference in nominal values across time due to strong and persistent inflation rates. In 
order to overcome this problem, we are using statistics in R$ (2000) deflated by the GDP index 
of prices. The comparison will be made when comparable measures are available. Even if this 
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choice limits the extension of the potential comparisons, it allows us to obtain reliable enough 
results. 
 
 
Table 2: GDP per capita by state deflated by GDP price index (R$, 2000) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: 
author) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Quantitative Statistics 
 2001 2005 
Average 5.02 6.12 
Std Dev. 2.91 3.95 
Min.  1.63 
(Maranhão) 
2.33 
(Piauí) 
Max. 14.24 
(Distrito Federal) 
21.75 
(Distrito Federal) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income levels across Brazilian states are very unequal. The quantitative statistics resume the 
information provided by the detailed Table 2 on the left-hand side. The level of individual 
income increased in recent years as far as polarization. Figure 7 shows the progressive 
polarization process experiences of Brazilian states since 1980.8 The polarization effect implies 
that a progressive unequal growth process has been followed by each single state. Of course, 
various hypotheses can be put forward in order to understand the sources of this process: a 
                                                 
8 In the Appendix, there is a short technical description of the Kernel estimators as well as the technique we applied 
to compute it. The Kernel estimations included in this text are made with the Stata 9.0 software package. 
  2001 2005 
Acre 3.07 4.28 
Alagoas 2.41 2.95 
Amazonas 6.54 6.48 
Amapá 4.25 4.63 
Bahia 3.61 4.15 
Ceará 2.60 3.18 
Distrito Federal 14.24 21.75 
Espírito Santo 6.50 8.73 
Goiás 4.44 5.67 
Maranhão 1.63 2.61 
Minas Gerais 5.70 6.31 
Mato Grosso do Sul 5.92 6.02 
Mato Grosso 5.13 8.42 
Pará 3.10 3.54 
Paraíba 2.70 2.96 
Pernambuco 3.61 3.74 
Piauí 1.77 2.33 
Paraná 6.84 7.78 
Rio de Janeiro 9.26 10.12 
Rio Grande do Norte 3.18 3.75 
Rondônia 3.78 5.30 
Roraima 3.24 5.12 
Rio Grande do Sul 8.32 8.39 
Santa Catarina 7.77 9.16 
Sergipe 4.10 4.30 
São Paulo 9.68 11.33 
Tocantins 2.38 4.38 
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different composition of the economic structure or a strong demographic effect. We will check 
for these in the following. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: GDP per capita by state deflated by GDP price index: comparison across years 
(R$, 2000) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
0 5 10 15 20 25
x
kdensity pib1980 kdensity pib2001
kdensity pib2005
 
 
Figure 8: Source of income: rural and urban income per capita (R$, 2000 – deflated by INPC – before 1979 
and IPC-RJ after 1979) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
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Figure 8 and Table 3 need to be interpreted jointly. By looking at the evolution of the GDP 
composition (Table 3), Brazilian states seem to be following an interesting evolution of the 
contribution of each sector of production in the total GDP. On average, service sectors account 
for more than half of the total production. Agriculture still has quite a relevant weight (around 
10%) but industry is progressively losing its relative weight in the creation of the national gross 
internal product. 
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This effect is not new. As discussed in Nicolini (2007), this kind of path is similar to that of 
other countries – such as Spain – that followed a peculiar development process by passing from 
an economy with a strong presence of the agricultural sector to services without passing through 
the industrial phase. 
 In fact, by looking at the composition of the sources of income (Figure 8), there is a strong 
tendency to make uniform the creation of income in the rural areas (across states) against a 
strong polarization in the creation of income in urban areas. This last effect implies that there 
are areas that are more productive than others, and, hence, where production is more efficient 
than in others. 
 What does this uneven urbanization effect imply? 
 As discussed in Overman and Venable (2005), the urbanization process (above all in 
developing countries) entails important effects. In fact, urbanization means that productivity 
tends to be higher in cities as well as per-capita income. However, another indirect effect often 
accompanies the urbanization process: discrimination between first-rank cities (those with a 
larger size) and the others appears. The former group attracts more investments and reinforces 
its dominance in displaying a higher rate of productivity growth and, hence, deepens the gap 
with the latter one. According to Henderson (2002), standardized manufacturing tends to be 
concentrated in the medium-size and smaller metropolitan areas, while services and not 
standardized manufacturing are likely to be found in large cities. Large-size cities are the most 
natural environment for attracting workers, allowing them a high mobility among the different 
industries. Moreover, spillovers, due to the size effects, improve workers’ skills and match 
better the requirement of the demand. In the case of Brazilian cities, the so-called urbanization 
effect is very important. In particular, the so-called localization effect is the main force driving 
the whole process. This effect is usually associated with the positive spillover effects issued by 
the close proximity of firms belonging to the same sector of production. 
 In a country such as Brazil, this growing urbanization rate is sustained by the intense 
migration flows from the rural to the metropolitan areas; as a consequence, a dual problem 
appears (Wagner de Albuquerque Oliveira et al., 2007).9 
                                                 
9 This is the major issue of the Harris–Todaro model. There is a possible cost of urbanization that is the associated 
development of low wage and low productivity urban labor. The high urban wage attracts inflow labor to the city in 
search of jobs in the formal sector. Migrants not finding a job in the formal sector are unemployed and work for 
much lower wages in the urban informal sector. The high concentration of unemployment in the outskirts of the 
cities is the first factor favoring the surge of discrimination and segregation problems (Zenou, 2009).  
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 According to the economic geography theory, urban areas often suffer from the dual 
problem. However, beside a pure migration effect, a demographic component can also be 
present. 
 
 
 
Table 3: GDP composition by sector (R$, 2000) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
    2001   2005 
    Agric. Ind. Serv.   Agric. Ind. Serv. 
Acre   5.6 24.3 70.0   20.0 11.5 68.5 
Alagoas   10.6 29.7 59.7   8.6 27.1 64.3 
Amazonas   2.3 66.1 31.7   5.2 44.3 50.5 
Amapá   5.1 9.0 85.9   3.2 11.4 85.4 
Bahia   10.5 41.6 47.9   8.6 32.2 59.2 
Ceará   5.2 37.0 57.8   6.0 23.1 70.9 
Distrito Federal   0.5 6.7 92.8   0.2 7.5 92.3 
Espírito Santo   5.3 38.4 56.3   8.8 33.8 57.5 
Goiás   17.5 35.0 47.4   13.4 26.0 60.7 
Maranhão   17.1 23.5 59.4   17.8 17.2 65.0 
Minas Gerais   7.4 41.7 50.9   9.3 32.5 58.2 
Mato Grosso do 
Sul   32.0 22.5 45.5   15.5 17.3 67.3 
Mato Grosso   24.5 22.2 53.3   32.2 18.7 49.2 
Pará   23.4 33.4 43.1   8.9 33.1 57.9 
Paraíba   12.2 32.5 55.2   7.1 22.5 70.4 
Pernambuco   8.5 31.9 59.6   5.1 22.1 72.8 
Piauí   10.4 27.1 62.5   11.4 17.1 71.5 
Paraná   13.0 43.8 43.2   8.5 30.2 61.4 
Rio de Janeiro   0.7 46.5 52.8   0.5 30.2 69.3 
Rio Grande do 
Norte   2.3 43.4 54.3   5.6 26.0 68.3 
Rondônia   15.1 28.3 56.5   20.4 13.9 65.6 
Roraima   4.5 8.9 86.6   7.7 11.0 81.3 
Rio Grande do Sul   14.5 40.0 45.5   7.1 30.3 62.7 
Santa Catarina   13.5 49.4 37.1   8.3 34.0 57.7 
Sergipe   6.0 52.3 41.7   4.4 33.3 62.2 
São Paulo   6.5 41.3 52.2   1.8 31.7 66.5 
Tocantins   14.1 30.5 55.4   21.9 27.4 50.7 
                  
Average   10.7 33.6 55.7   9.9 24.6 65.5 
 
 
  
 Figure 9 presents the Kernel statistics concerning the changes in the distribution of the 
population since 1980. In spite of the progressive polarization process experienced by income, 
the population seems to be following a more de-polarization process (through migration or 
different fertility rates) even if most of it is still concentrated in the urban areas. 
 Is discrimination present in Brazilian urban areas and states? 
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Figure 9: Population distribution (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
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 Another important factor to take into account is the composition of the population and its 
structure.  
 
Figure 10: Inequality index: Theil index for the population (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
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 Brazilian citizens can be roughly split into two large groups (black and white) and we carry 
out our analysis by means of the Theil index.10 By looking at the evolution in time of the index, 
we are able to identify whether inequality within the population (and a group) was reinforced or 
weakened. 
                                                 
10 The Theil index is considered one of the major measures of inequality. By taking a perfectly equal distribution as 
a reference, it measures the degree of inequality inside a population. It is not considered as a perfect measure, hence 
there is not a fixed range of values it can take. The range of possible values spans from zero (representing a 
completely equal distribution) to infinity (meaning the maximum unequal distribution). An interesting property of 
the Theil index is to be additive across different subgroups. 
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 This particular Theil index has been computed by considering the per-capita income. As 
presented in Figure 10, a clear process of reduction of inequalities is taking place across 
Brazilian states from 1970 to 2000. However, in the most recent years (2000–2007), a slight 
recrudescence of inequality seems to have been taking place. 
 In Figure 11, we are representing the evolution of the Theil index for the two groups of 
population in Brazil and the results are quite different. Within the group of black citizens, there 
is a clear pattern showing that a redistribution process (favoring equality) is in place, even if the 
degree of ‘equality’ achieved in this group is lower than the degree of the white group. On the 
other hand, the whole white group does not record any relevant change in the degree of 
inequality but a clear de-polarization process seems to occur in 2000 with respect to 1991. 
 
Figure 11: Inequality index: Theil index for the black and white populations (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: 
author) 
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 By comparing the distribution of the Theil index between the average and the two major 
groups (as we do in Figure 12), a strong pattern seems to be persistent within the structure of the 
Brazilian society across states: the black group always presents a much higher rate of inequality 
than the white one, even if this difference has been smoothed in time. 
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Figure 12: Inequality index: Theil index for the black and white populations in 1991 and 2000 (Source: IBGE, 
IPEA, calculus: author) 
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 The same pattern also holds when considering the rate of poverty in the two groups (we are 
considering the percentage of poor persons over the total population of a specific group) (Figure 
13).11 
 In Brazil, poverty strikes both black and white people, with a relative higher percentage for 
black persons. Moreover, in 1991, the group of black poor persons presented a clear polarized 
distribution density while this was not the case for the white group. Nowadays, the distribution 
pattern is qualitatively identical in the two groups. 
 
Figure 13: Poverty in 1991 and 2000 (% total population) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
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 This type of result is also replicated in Figure 14. 
 
                                                 
11 Poverty is measured as the percentage of persons whose income is lower than R$34.75 (monthly), which 
correspond to ¼ of the minimum wage in August 2000. 
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Figure 14: Poverty in the black and white populations (%) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
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Table 4: Living conditions: households with the current water supply service (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: 
author) 
 
   1991      2000   
 Total % Black % White  Total % Black % White 
Acre 22,261 26.0 42.8  46,720 33.5 44.8 
Alagoas 233,043 42.4 59.2  411,679 57.9 70.0 
Amazonas 198,210 48.6 67.4  342,709 49.9 68.5 
Amapá 28,286 54.1 66.5  50,032 59.5 69.7 
Bahia 1,077,511 43.1 54.2  2,203,903 57.9 67.2 
Ceará 491,725 35.5 50.5  1,068,746 55.1 67.0 
Distrito Federal 313,156 82.2 92.0  485,652 92.5 96.4 
Espírito Santo 403,222 74.0 88.1  679,279 90.3 96.2 
Goiás 499,836 63.5 78.4  971,358 85.4 91.9 
Maranhão 221,567 22.1 35.1  654,220 29.3 42.7 
Minas Gerais 2,511,827 68.4 85.9  3,953,396 84.3 94.0 
Mato Grosso do Sul 273,791 70.5 82.5  440,605 86.3 93.8 
Mato Grosso 208,788 53.2 67.4  411,233 69.3 83.0 
Pará 293,241 34.4 50.3  558,213 41.3 55.6 
Paraíba 352,068 47.5 59.1  584,190 62.7 71.5 
Pernambuco 872,983 52.1 65.5  1,388,529 63.2 73.0 
Piauí 172,817 31.0 44.6  402,102 44.4 58.1 
Paraná 1,434,412 74.0 85.4  2,227,821 92.0 95.5 
Rio de Janeiro 2,787,027 86.3 95.2  3,540,177 90.8 95.9 
Rio Grande do Norte 248,468 43.2 59.1  525,739 62.4 74.9 
Rondônia 68,455 37.4 49.2  106,759 58.2 71.4 
Roraima 20,696 51.4 69.9  58,992 63.5 75.4 
Rio Grande do Sul 1,740,391 72.6 88.8  2,423,264 89.0 95.9 
Santa Catarina 684,584 73.2 92.2  1,117,430 91.0 97.1 
Sergipe 191,868 56.1 68.8  330,039 68.7 77.8 
São Paulo 7,169,870 92.4 96.8  9,690,889 96.8 98.2 
Tocantins 39,561 25.4 43.9  185,717 50.4 66.2 
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 The relevant differences between the two communities also exist for other indicators of the 
living conditions and not just income. Table 4 makes the comparison between the two groups by 
focusing on the percentage of households with current water supply services in 1991 and 2000. 
The water service has been implemented throughout. In a few states (São Paulo, Santa Catarina, 
Districto Federal or Paraná), there is not a significant difference between the two groups in the 
conditions of the standard of living. In others, such as Piauí, both groups are suffering from poor 
living conditions. However, there are other states in which differences across the two groups are 
quite important (Amazonas, Caerá or Maranhão), meaning that a real inequality situation is 
taking place over there.  
 Finally, a last indicator that it can be useful to take into account is the analfabetism rate as a 
proxy for the human capital formation (see Table 5).  
 Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposal information concerning the two groups, but 
evidence confirms that policies that have been implemented allowed the reduction of the 
analfabetism rate in these last years, making it more uniform across the territory. 
 
Table 5: Analfabetism rate (≥15 years) (% of total population) (Source: IBGE, IPEA, calculus: author) 
 
 2001 2005 
Average 14.88 13.81 
Std Dev. 8.05 7.71 
Min.  6 
(Rio de Janeiro ) 
5 
(Distrito Federal) 
Max. 31 
(Alagoas) 
29 
(Alagoas) 
 
 
 The final picture of the current situation across Brazilian states underlines the deep social 
and economic transformation this country is experiencing. The polarization of income and 
urbanization (with all the consequences produced by a strong rate of urbanization) are the most 
evident features of the uneven development process that is taking place in Brazil. Beside the 
policies that have been adopted in order to reduce the gap between the south and the north-east, 
inequalities in income per capita and inequalities across groups still persist even if smoothed. 
 As in the case of the European Union, the persistence of inequalities across space is a 
problem that demands to be faced and, possibly, solved. 
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 In this spirit, the experience of the progress made in the European Union can teach 
something and the policies implemented by the Structural Funds can provide some valuable 
suggestions.  
 Let us briefly describe the three most relevant points that can bridge the two realities. 
 
1. Objectives of the policies.  
As we discussed, one of the principal objectives targeted by the policies adopted by the 
European Union is to foster the creation of an economic and social environment as the main 
sources of growth and convergence across regions. Economic growth and human capital 
formation go ‘hand in hand’ when thinking of sustainable growth and the convergence 
process across regions. This is basically the motivation to support different plans of 
intervention and target different intermediate objectives: training of the workers, education, 
creation of infrastructures, funding the research and development and supporting firm 
activities. 
 The European policies principally target creating an environment that can stimulate the 
economic activities. The policies are not exclusively addressed to firms, even if they are one 
of the principal recipients. The advantage of funding different parallel activities produces 
interesting returns not only from an economic but also from a social viewpoint. Fostering 
education is also a tool to foster mobility among the different states of the Union. 
 Do these policies pay? Even if a clear core–periphery structure is distinguishing the 
current economic structure of the European Union, some interesting results have been 
achieved. A convergence process has been taking place, even if not as impressive (in some 
cases) as one could have expected. However, some results are tangible. 
 By comparing these policies with the different activities sponsored by the government in 
Brazil (for instance the Constitutional Funds), the difference is quite striking: these 
interventions target the firms and partially the creation of infrastructures. The European 
experience could suggest extending the intervention to a wide range of objectives associated 
with the social and economic environment. 
 
2. Firms and agglomerations 
The European experience, as well as other case studies all around the world, claim that 
supporting the creation of an agglomeration of firms (such as networks of firms) to foster 
the local development does not always turn out to be the right choice. As theoretically 
argued by Nicolini (2003) or empirically by Cooke and Morgan (1998), local 
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agglomerations of firms cannot always guarantee the expected results. Beyond the purely 
economic argument, there are some other factors related to the social environment that may 
affect the achievement of the objective of maximizing the local welfare, and hence prevent 
the networks of firms from being a really a feasible way to support economic growth. Once 
more, the experience of the European Union of targeting the increase of both economic and 
social standards can be a path to follow to ensure the economic development process.  
 
3. Financing strategies 
The current debate to finance policy for local development across European states is not a 
clear issue and does not present a unique sustainable solution. The current debate among the 
European members and the lack of a concrete agreement are clear examples. 
 On one hand, there is the concern to grant capital to finance potential successful projects 
(hence making the right selection) as well as avoiding any kind of free-rider problem. In that 
sense, testing the solvency of the potential recipients of those credits is important. 
 On the other hand, there are projects that are quite risky or that are too big to be financed 
under the scheme of the regular market credit conditions. There is sometimes the need to 
grant capital as subsidies (hence, with no expected return of the invested amount) or other 
similar forms instead of credits. This is because of the aim to finance not only economic 
initiatives, but also social ones with the purpose of improving the economic and social 
conditions of the local environment. Therefore, it is not always possible to think of having 
some activities with real and tangible returns. Moreover, there are also projects (such as the 
creation of infrastructures) that need a huge amount of capital and a centralized management 
of the activity that cannot be dealt with under the usual credit market constraints. 
 As a consequence, planning policies interventions means also considering a good mix 
between centralized (at state level) and private activities (controlled by firms) really to 
guarantee a complete and balanced development process.  
 Of course, this complex way of financing strategies requires a more complicated way of 
finding capital suitable for investment in these activities. Local authorities can address 
international or national institutions to raise funds, but they could also ask to rely on regular 
capital flows granted by the central government. On the other side, central governments 
need to find the resources in their budgets to meet such a demand. This is exactly part of the 
problem that European states and regions are currently facing. All the tentative initiatives 
that are discussed try to implement the current and imperfect financing system that is able to 
guarantee the support of both centralized and private activities.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002), policy interventions may affect the 
outcome of the integration process, by targeting the reorganization of the distribution of factors 
or the attractiveness of a few selected locations.   
 The spatial spreading of activities that follows a core–periphery structure guarantees good 
perspectives for economic growth and development in the ‘core’ area but less so in the 
periphery. Besides, thinking of developing growth strategies only by supporting the creation of 
networks of firms does not guarantee the achievement of the expected results. There are several 
factors (such as the local social environment and the qualification of the labor force) that play an 
important role in the effectiveness of the economic mechanisms that may affect the efficiency of 
the networks of firms. Hence, policies that aim at having an impact should not neglect to plan a 
wide spectrum of interventions. 
 Moreover, when the major findings of the economic geography are taken as a reference, in 
order to replicate them, it is also important to fulfill the basic requirements underpinning the 
results. When considering the policy to improve the spreading of activities by financing the 
settlement of firms in the less developed areas, it is also important to foster quite a high mobility 
rate of workers by granting them the proper incentives to move to the less attractive areas. The 
relatively quite low interstate migration across Brazilian states (as happens within the European 
Union) is one of the important factors to control for, allowing the complete fulfillment of the 
expected results, in the case of targeting policies to the creation of agglomerations of firms in 
the less developed areas. 
 Targeting to foster development through the creation of local agglomerations, and hence 
fostering the concentration of activities, workers and population in specific areas, also imposes a 
consideration for the sustainable development of cities. When the economic development is 
associated with a high urbanization rate (as in Brazil) due to a high migration rate from the rural 
to urban areas, cities are not excluded from suffering from social problems such as conflicts or 
segregations also fuelled by the important income inequalities arising between various groups 
(for instance natives and immigrants or the black and the white populations). 
 There is no clear and unique development strategy that authorities should adopt in order to 
promote internal development. On the base of the experience of the European Union, public 
interventions should be thought of as a mixture of public policies with a relevant impact on the 
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territory, policies addressed to the firms and, finally, other interventions with a greater emphasis 
on social content, such as education and training. A wide concept of economic development 
such as that intended by the European policy is a mix of economic and social priorities aiming 
at qualifying the social environment jointly with the economic one. 
 The program and the mechanism put in place by the European Union are not perfect. There 
are still several open points, above all regarding the selection of the really feasible projects, the 
way to finance them and the right incentives to provide to compel recipients (namely agents) to 
behave properly. At the same time, there is the wide debate among the European member states 
about the general criteria on how to keep on financing those programs. 
 Nevertheless, some interesting results have been obtained: various regions have experienced 
a convergence process and the overall mobility across European territory has increased. 
 This is the reason that causes this experience to be evaluated as interesting, even if rather 
imperfect. It shows some strategies to adopt to follow quite a balanced economic and social 
development path that could also be adapted in other contexts. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Figure 15:  Map of Brazil. (Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Kernel Density: a non-parametric technique 
A nonparametric technique is a flexible form of estimation. The simplest nonparametric density 
estimate of a distribution of a series is the histogram, but it is not continuous.  
 
The kernel density estimator replaces the “boxes” in a histogram by “bumps” that are smooth. 
Smoothing is done by putting less weight on observations that are further from the point being 
evaluated(x). More technically, the kernel density estimate of a series X at a point x is estimated 
by 
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where N is the number of observations, h is the bandwidth (or smoothing parameter) and K(·) is 
a kernel function that integrates to one. 
 
The kernel function K(·) is a weighting function that determines the shape of the bumps.  
We use the Gaussian kernel function that downs weights on points as the distance from x 
increases. Unlike most kernel functions, this is unbounded on x and each observation is included 
in the estimation (Härdle, 1990). 
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Appendix 3 
 
European Programmes: facts and figures12 
 
Period: 2007-2013 
 
In view of improving the performance of European economies, the Commission decided 
to concentrate the effort on three main priorities: 
 
1) Promoting sustainable development by sustaining the integration process of 
the internal market.  
2)  Promoting the role of the European Union as a global partner. 
3) Reinforcing the idea of European citizenship by completing the area of 
freedom, justice and security and ensuring access to basic public goods and 
services. 
 
According to these priorities, three objectives have been identifies: Convergence, 
Regional Competitiveness and Territorial co-operation. 
 
The rational of the Convergence objective is to promote growth-enhancing conditions 
and factors to lead to real convergence the least developed Member States and Regions: around 
84 regions (belonging to 17 States in the EU-27) with a per-capita GDP at less than 75% and 
other 16 regions on a “phasing out” basis with a per-capita GDP slightly above the threshold). 
 
 The Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective aims at strengthening 
competitiveness and attractiveness, as well as employment through: 
a. Developing programmes that will help regions to promote economic change through 
innovation, the promotion of the knowledge society, entrepreneurship, the protection of 
the environment, and better infrastructures. 
b. Better jobs will be supported by adapting the workforce by investing in human 
resources. 
 
                                                 
12 Source of reference: http://ec.europa.eu. 
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Finally, the European Territorial Co-operation objective will strengthen cross border co-
operation with joint regional initiatives and co-operation for integrating the territorial 
development. 
 
 In order to achieve these objectives, the European Union implemented a few specific 
funding programmes. 
 
The Structural Funds13 are funds intended to facilitate structural adjustment of specific 
sectors, regions or the combination of both in the European Union. They include the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the Guidance Section of 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG).14 
 
 The ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund contribute to the three objectives: 
Convergence (81.54% of the total budget), Regional Competitiveness and Employment (15.95% 
of the total budget), and European Territorial Cooperation (2.52% of the total budget) (Table 
A3.1). 
 
  The ERDF aims at strengthen economic and social cohesion in the European 
Union by correcting the imbalances between regions. It finances: 
- Aid investments in companies to create jobs, 
- Infrastructures, Research and Development, Telecommunications, Environment, Energy 
and Transport, 
- Financial instruments to support the regional and local development and foster the 
cooperation between town and regions, 
- Technical assistance measures. 
 
The ERDF intervenes in the three objectives of regional policy: 
a. Convergence, 
                                                 
13 The way to spend the Structural Fund is based on a system of shared responsibility between the European 
Commission and the Member State authorities. The European Commission negotiates and approves the 
development programme proposed by the Member States; the Member States (or regions) manage the programmes 
implementing the policies and the Commission’s task is monitoring. All projects to be funded need to target the 
priorities of the European Union regarding the promotion of the competitiveness and job creation (Lisbon strategy) 
and there are ceilings for co-financing rares: Convergence (75-85%), Competitiveness (50-85%), European 
Territorial Cooperation (75-85%) and Cohesion Funds (85%). 
14 Source: www.oecd.org. 
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b. Regional Competitiveness and Employment,  
c. European Territorial Cooperation. 
  
The ESF aims at improving employment and job opportunities in the European Union. It 
supports: 
- Adapting workers and enterprises, 
- Access to employment for job seekers, 
- Social integration of disadvantages peoples and combating discrimination in the job 
market, 
- Strengthening human capital by reforming the education system. 
  
This fund intervenes in the framework of the Convergence and Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment objectives. 
 
The Cohesion Fund is addressed to Member States whose gross national income is less then 
90% of the Community average. It serves to reduce their economic shortfall and supports 
actions in the framework of the Convergence objective. This fund finances (i) trans-European 
transport network, (ii) environment, above all projects associated to energy, energy efficiency, 
renewable energy etc.. 
 
 In addition other programmes belonging to the Regional Policy scheme: 
 
1. Instruments for the Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Since 2007, IPA replaces a 
series of European Union Programmes (namely Phare, ISPA, Sapard, Cards) and 
financial instruments for candidate countries or potential candidate countries (as 
Turkey, for instance). The main objectives of this programme are: assistance in 
building institutions, cross-border co-operation with EU members, regional 
development (transport, environment and economic development), human 
resources and rural development.  
 
 
2. Financing Engineering:  
Jaspers: promoting cooperation in order to pool expertise and resources among 
Member States in order to implement the cohesion policy, 
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Jeremie: improving access to finance for micro business and small and medium 
enterprises in the regions of the European Union. It is a joint initiative of the 
European Commission, the European Investment Bank and the  European 
Investment Fund. 
Jessica: supporting a sustainable growth, jobs and investment in urban areas inside 
the European Union. 
 
3. European Solidarity Fund (EUSF). Since 2003, it provides emergency aid in 
response to major (natural) disasters striking Member States. EUSF supplements 
public expenditure by individual Member States for emergency aid, limited to 
non-insurable damage (restoration of infrastructures, energy, drinking water, 
waste water, transport, health and education, temporary accommodation etc…). 
 
Period: 2000-2006 
 
In the period 2000-2006 the principal programmes were the following ones: 
 
 Structural Funds: 
- Objective 1: Its main priority was the European Union’s cohesion policy. It managed 
more than 2/3 of the total amount of Structural Funds for helping areas lagging behind in 
their development (namely with low level of investment, high unemployment rate,  lack 
of services for businesses and individuals, and poor infrastructures) where the GDP was 
below 75% of the Community average. 
 
- Objective 2: The main aim of this part of Structural Funds was to revitalise all areas 
facing structural difficulties (in industry, rural or urban areas) that are often sources of 
high unemployment rates. This is the case of the decline in traditional activities in rural 
areas, difficulties affecting the fisheries activities or a crisis in urban areas. 
 
 
- Objective 3. Its aim was to support the adaptation and the modernisation of education, 
training and unemployment policies and systems in regions not eligible under Objective 
1. Its goal was to modernise education and training policy and systems to promote 
employment. 
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Other programmes were:  
- Interreg III. It was an initiative aiming at stimulating the interregional cooperation in the 
European Union. The emphasis was on integrating the most remote regions sharing 
external borders with the candidate countries.  
 
- Urban II. This was part of the community initiative for sustainable development in the 
urban districts of the European Union. It aimed to promote the design and 
implementation of innovative models of development for the economic and social 
regeneration of troubled urban areas.  
 
- Innovative action. The innovative actions were laboratories of ideas for regions.  They 
provide ‘risk space’ to regional actors in order to respond to the challenges of the new 
economy. The strategic themes that were financed were: knowledge-based regional 
economies and technical innovation, the (regional) information society and the regional 
identity and the sustainable development. 
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Table A3.1 : Cohesion policy 2007-2013: Indicative financial allocations (Millions €, current prices) 
(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/fonds/index_en.htm) 
 
 
 
Convergence Objective 
Regional 
Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective 
 
Cohesion 
Fund 
Convergence 
Statistical 
Phasing -out 
Phasing-in 
Regional 
Competitiveness 
and Employment 
European 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
Objective 
 
 
 
Total 
België/Belgique   638  1 425 194 2 258 
Bulgaria 2 283 4 391    179 6 853 
Ceska Republica 8 819 17 064   419 389 26 692 
Denmark     510 103 613 
Deutschland  11 864 4 215  9 409 851 26 340 
Eesti 1 152 2 252    52 3 456 
Ellas 3 697 9 420 6 458 635  210 20 420 
España 3 543 21 054 1 583 4 955 3 522 559 35 217 
France  3 191   10 257 872 14 319 
Ireland    458 293 151 901 
Italia  21 211 430 972 5 353 846 28 812 
Kyopros 213   399  28 640 
Latvija 1 540 2 991    90 4 620 
Lietuva 2 305 4 470    109 6 885 
Luxemburg     50 15 65 
Magyarorszag 8 642 14 248  2 031  386 25 307 
Malta 284 556    15 855 
Nederland     1 660 247 1 907 
Österreich   177  1 027 257 1 461 
Polska 22 176 44 377    731 67 284 
Portugal 3 060 17 133 280 448 490 99 21 511 
Slovenija 1 412 2 689    104 4 205 
Slovensko 3 899 7 013   449 227 11 588 
Suomi-Finland    545 1 051 120 1 716 
Sverige     1 626 265 1 891 
United Kingdom  2 738 174 965 6 014 722 10 613 
Romania 6 552 12 661    455 19 668 
Interregional      445 445 
Technical Assistance       868 
TOTAL 69 578 199 322 13 955 11 409 43 556 8 723 347 410 
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